THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY (by Immanuel Kant) (Part 2)
THE MORAL LAW.
A. Idea of the moral law
- — Everything in nature acts according to laws. But only a reasonable being has the power to act according to the representation of laws, that is, according to principles or, in other words, has a will.
This difference between natural objects and reasonable beings is fundamental: on it rests the main distinction between the physical sciences and the moral sciences. A body which, left to itself, falls to the ground, is subject to the law of gravity; but a man who is subject to legal or moral laws behaves quite differently from the grave: the efficacy of the law presupposes that he has the representation or consciousness of the law. Thus, while the grave is entirely passive, the man is active: the value of the law is manifested through his consent and through the very possibility he has of transgressing it. This means that human action implies a will, an active principle, which mediates the activity of the law; on the other hand, natural objects are subjected to the laws immediately, without consciousness or will of their own.
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- — And since reason is required to infer actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason unfailingly determines the will, then the resulting actions are objectively and subjectively necessary: that is, the will is a faculty of choosing only what reason, independently of all inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good. But if reason by itself does not sufficiently determine the will, then the will is still subject to subjective conditions (to certain impulses), which do not always agree with objective conditions; in short, if value is not in itself entirely in accordance with reason (as is actually the case among men), then the actions that objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will, in accordance with objective laws, is a compulsion.
The principle posited in the previous number already contains within itself the explanation of what will is. It is a power to consciously conform to law, that is, to derive individual actions from laws. If we call, like Kant, theoretical reason the power of the mind to come to knowledge of the law, we can call this same power practical reason insofar as it takes place no longer to knowledge but to the implementation of the law in individual actions.
So the will is practical reason.
Now, if man were all reason, human actions would have an objective necessity, because it is proper for reason to conceive, then translate into action, principles of objective value, which are not subject to vary from individual to individual; and the objective prescription of rational law would coincide with the subjective behavior of the individual. But man is not all reason: in him there are passions, inclinations, subjective impulses that diverge from rational law. Thus the objectivity of the law does not necessarily correspond to the subjectivity of the agent, and the action which, from the standpoint of pure reason, would be necessary, becomes contingent, because subjective inclinations and passions may divert man from following the rational precept. How is it then that the authority of law and reason can be reestablished? By means of a compulsion, an imposition: reason commands the individual to subordinate his subjective and disturbing impulses to the dictate of the law.
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B. The Imperative
- — The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is coactive for the will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called the Imperative.
Coercion, which was discussed in the previous number, as a means of bridging the imbalance between the objective and rational necessity of action and the subjective contingency of it, is expressed in the form of a command, that is, an imperative. And it follows from this in a peculiar way the difference with which the action of laws is manifested in the world of spirit and in the world of nature, where objects are subject not to imperatives but to fatal necessity.
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- — All imperatives are expressed by a duty and thus indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which, according to its subjective character, is not necessarily subordinate to it. Imperatives say that it would be good to do or not to do a certain thing; but they say this to a will that does not always do some thing just because it is represented to it that it would be good to do it.
What was said of the latter in the previous number applies to duty, as an expression of imperative: it does not make sense for a natural object, which conforms by inescapable necessity to its laws, but only for a will that “according to its subjective character” (i.e., because of the interference of inner and irrational influences), “is not necessarily subordinate to the objective law of reason” (i.e., it can derogate from the norm itself).
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- — Practically good is that which by means of the representations of reason, and thus not by subjective, but objective causes-such that are valid for every reasonable being-determines the will. It is distinguished from the pleasant, which only by means of sensations, and thus by merely subjective causes, valid only for this or that individual, but not as a rational principle valid for all, exerts an influence on the will.
The notion of the “practically good” and the “pleasant” represents a new formulation of the same disagreement we have already noted between the objective necessity of reason and the subjective contingency of passionate impulses. “Good” is that which corresponds to rational law, and is therefore valid for all; “pleasant” is that which satisfies the subjectivity (or, we may say, sensibility, in opposition to reason) of the individual. This new formulation of the antithesis will enable us, in the ensuing issue, to make a new application of the same principle.
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— Now, a perfectly good will would, yes, be subject to the objective laws (of the good), but it could not therefore be imagined as compelled to actions in conformity with the laws, because the mere representation of the good would suffice to determine it by virtue of a subjective structure. Therefore, for the divine will and, in general, for a “holy” will, imperatives have no value: duty is out of place here, because the will is already in itself and necessarily one with the law.
— Therefore imperatives are merely formulas expressing the relation of the objective laws of the will in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that reasonable being.
We saw in paragraph №2 that if man were all rational, human actions would have an objective necessity and the law would not be imposed by the compulsion of an imperative. This means, according to the formulation adopted in paragraph №5, that if the human will were perfectly good, it would do good without the need to be compelled to do so. Thus we think that the divine will acts and, in its likeness, every holy will. But the human will is not entirely good, because of the already known interference of subjective, sensible impulses: hence the definition of the imperative given in paragraph № 7.
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C. Various species of imperatives
- — Imperatives are hypothetical and categorical. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to something else that is desired (or possible to be desired) to be achieved. The categorical imperative is that which represents an action as objectively necessary for itself, without reference to another end.
The distinction of the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative is of paramount importance in circumscribing the sphere of morality. Hypothetical imperative is one that makes its command conditional on the occurrence of a given hypothesis. It is expressed thus: if you want to achieve a given end, do such a thing! Thus the command is not valid in itself, as an autonomous end to be achieved, but is merely a means to another end, and therefore falls if we give up the end. In contrast, in the categorical imperative, the command is not subordinate to something else, but is an end in itself. It says “do this” and binds the will to the fulfillment of the task, without it having, as in the previous case, the possibility of escaping it, precisely because, the end being implicit in the command, it is necessary.
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- — Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and therefore necessary for a subject that can be practically determined through reason, all imperatives are formulas designed to necessarily determine the action according to the principle of a will that is nevertheless good. If the action is good only as a means to another thing, the imperative is hypothetical; if, on the other hand, it is represented as good in itself, and therefore necessary for a will in itself in accordance with reason, the imperative is categorical.
In this paragraph a new formulation of the distinction posed is given, recalling that already given in #5 in relation to the imperative formula in general. Given that the imperative, as an expression of a law of reason, prescribes a good, the distinction between the hypothetical imperative and the categorical consists in that the one prescribes a good as a means to another end (i.e., prescribes that which “is good to some thing”), while the other commands that which “is good in itself,” that is, that which has in itself and does not borrow from others the reason for its goodness. The passage in the text, “all imperatives are formulas aimed at determining etc.,” has a certain obscurity, despite the fact that I have translated it very freely. The sense is this: the law describes a good that determines with necessity the action; therefore imperatives in general (the hypothetical and categorical equally) are formulas that determine action by virtue of the principle of any good. This is the general formula, which is then specified in the two particular cases: if the good is a simple good to something else , then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is a good in itself, categorical.
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— The imperative thus says what action to me possible would be good, and represents the practical rule with reference to a will, which is not able to perform an action without fail just because it is good, partly because the agent does not always know that it is good, and partly because it might be the case that, even known as such, its maxims were contrary to the objective principles of a practical reason.
— The hypothetical imperative therefore says that the action is good in relation to a possible end or an actual end. In the former case it is a practically problematic principle; in the latter case, assertory. The categorical imperative, which explains action as objectively necessary for itself, without regard to any other end, holds as a practically apodictic principle.
The bipartition of imperatives made in the previous issue is developed here into a tripartition, because the hypothetical imperatives, which condition the command to an end to be achieved, are themselves subdivided, depending on whether that end is merely possible (i.e., it may or may not be there) or is real, in the sense that it always exists in fact, though without having the character of a rational necessity. In the following numbers, Kant extensively explains these two species of hypothetical imperatives (problematic and assertory), which are distinguished from the categorical imperative, which only expresses real necessity. This division of imperatives into problematic, assertory, and apodictic reproduces, in the order of practical relations, the division of theoretical judgments, studied by Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason.” Therefore he precedes the designations used by the adverb “practically.”
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D. Examples
- — All sciences have a practical part consisting of problems having for their object some possible end to be achieved, and imperatives concerning the ways of achieving it. The latter may therefore be called “imperatives of skill.” Whether the end is rational and good does not fall in question; it is only a question of what must be done to achieve it. The prescriptions a doctor uses to heal a sick person or a poisoner uses to kill him are of equal value in this respect, that each of them serves to achieve his intent perfectly.
The first subspecies of hypothetical imperatives is considered here: problem imperatives. The formula can be stated thus: if you want to become a good doctor or a good lawyer, follow these or those prescriptions. The imperative is problematic because the end may or may not be there: it is not necessarily the case that I want to be a good lawyer or a good doctor, and the imperative applies only in the case that the condition is there. All imperatives of skill, that is, concerning learning an art, scientific application, etc., have this character.
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- — One end that for all reasonable beings can be assumed to be real (that is, that they not only can have but have by nature) is that of happiness. Now, the hypothetical imperative, representingthe practical necessity of action, as the means to the attainment of happiness, is assertory. And the skill in choosing the means of bringing about one’s well-being to the utmost can be called prudence. So the imperative that refers to the choice of means for one’s happiness, that is, the prescription of prudence, is still always hypothetical: action is not commanded absolutely, but only as a means to another end.
Here we consider the second species of hypothetical imperatives: assertor imperatives. The end is no longer merely problematic, but is really found in everyone: there is no man who does not want happiness. So the formula: if you want to be happy, follow this or that prescription, has a somewhat different character from the imperative of ability, because there is no man who, in fact, can answer: I do not want happiness. However, even with this assertory element, the imperative does not cease to be hypothetical, because the means prescribed by it are always directed toward the attainment of an end that is outside of it.
E. The categorical imperative
- — Finally there is an imperative which, without grounding a certain conduct in another end to be achieved, makes it an immediate obligation. Such an imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, and what is to follow from it, but the form and principle from which the same matter follows, and the ‘essentially good of it lies in the intention, whatever the effect. This may be called the imperative of morality.
In this issue, the most essential characters of the categorical imperative are stated, which will be developed later. But, so that the idea of them will already be somewhat clearer than in the elliptical Kantian enunciation, we will give some summary elucidation. The hypothetical imperative is material, because in it the command has for its object a matter which is outside it, and which can be determined only by means of experience. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, is formal, in the sense that it does not presuppose outside itself a matter on which it must model itself, and its obligatory nature flows from the law itself, that is, from a pure form of reason. If we reflect that the categorical imperative is the imperative of morality, we can get a first rough idea of the intimate meaning of this formal character. For we know that the moral value of an action lies in that it does not depend on external circumstances, on hopes of reward or otherwise on factual conditions that are outside the agent or not entirely in his power, but is performed in pure obedience to the law. The formal-material antithesis is equivalent to the rational-sensible antithesis. While hypothetical imperatives imply a sensible content, indeed depend on it, the categorical imperative is a pure law of reason, which not only does not presuppose a sensible content, but rather subjugates and dominates sensibility.
Moreover, by the very fact that the moral (categorical) imperative repudiates all material condensation, the action that conforms to it has in itself the measure of its goodness: that is, it is good not because of the outward effect that results from it, but because it expresses the purity of heart, the selflessness, the good intention of the agent. Hence the great importance of the concept of intention in Kantian ethics, which represents the perfect adaptation of the agent’s subjectivity to the objective law of morality.
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- — The will, in these three species of principles, can also be easily distinguished according to the different degrees of imposition. And to make these differences sensible, I believe we can very effectively arrange them in the following order, calling them respectively: a) rules of skill; b) counsels of prudence; c) orders (or laws) of morality.
In fact, only law carries with it the concept of an unconditional, and therefore objective and universally valid necessity; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, which must be carried into effect even against inclination. Advice contains, yes a necessity, but such that it can be valid only in a subjective and contingent condition, that this or that man considers that this or that thing confers on his happiness. In contrast, the categorical imperative is not limited by any condition, and, insofar as it is absolutely necessary (at least in the practical regard), it can truly be called a command. One could also give the imperatives of the first species the name “technical” (belonging to art), those of the second the name “pragmatic” (concerning welfare), and those of the third the name “moral” (that is, belonging to free conduct in general or customs).
The three species of imperatives imply different degrees of coercion of the will: coercion is minimal in the problematic imperative, because it is subordinate to the condition that the individual wants to achieve an end that is in his or her own free will. In the second case, of the assertory imperative, the will is already more constrained, because it cannot escape the purpose, which is inherent in it. Nevertheless, even here one cannot speak of true compulsion, because, since the end does not have the character of an objective necessity, but depends on the subjective constitution of the agent, the relative means (i.e., norms) also depend on individual appreciation. The idea of happiness or well-being is not identical for all men, but each person represents it in his own way: therefore the precepts of prudence do not apply equally to all, but their value is subordinate to each person’s idea of the end to be achieved. Only in the categorical imperative is there a real command, precisely because the prescription it contains is not subordinated to a different and extraneous end, but is already an end in itself. Here therefore the compulsion is maximal, because the agent has no right to evade it by renouncing the end.